(Download) "Eileen C. Gelbman v. Joel C. Gelbman" by Supreme Court of New York # eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Eileen C. Gelbman v. Joel C. Gelbman
- Author : Supreme Court of New York
- Release Date : January 02, 1972
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 61 KB
Description
In our opinion, Special Term erred in granting plaintiffs cross motion for an award of arrears in support payments for the first six months of 1971 and for an increase in weekly support payments based on defendants alleged increase in income for 1971. The provisions of the divorce judgment clearly envision a yearly review of defendants financial status upon receipt by plaintiff of defendants tax return for a given calendar year. Upon such yearly times, plaintiff will be in a position to ascertain the increase, if any, in defendants "net income after taxes" and to make appropriate applications for increased support. However, Special Term found that defendants income had increased in the year 1971 solely on the basis of a court-ordered audit which only covered defendants financial condition for the first six months of 1971. Such a finding by Special Term was prematurely made and could not accurately reflect defendants financial condition for the whole of 1971. Consequently, the increase of the support award and the award of arrears, based on defendants alleged increased income for 1971, should be reversed, without prejudice to plaintiffs right to renew her application upon receipt of a copy of defendants tax return for the calendar year 1971. In any event, we note that Special Term incorrectly computed the amount of the arrears and the increase in support payments. The divorce judgment calls for an increase in support payments in the amount of "forty per cent of any increase of such net income after taxes". Nevertheless, the record indicates that Special Term computed 40% of defendants gross income after taxes for 1971, without even deducting business expenses, based on figures in the audit covering only the first six months of 1971. Finally, the award of counsel fees was excessive to the extent indicated herein.